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 What do we know about successful labour market reform options?  
 Which countries have successfully moved away from a dual labour market structure? 
 Gulf countries are of particular interest 
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1. Summary 
The literature identified for this report discusses labour market policy options with some case 
studies. Success is rarely claimed and difficult to attribute as a mixture of policies tend to be in 
place and a combination of policies is recommended. Policies also may take some time to 
produce results. Barriers to success and recommendations are highlighted from the literature.  
Dual labour markets are characterised by a segregation between jobs with higher and lower 
levels of security. In Europe the divide is characterised by fixed-term or short-term contracts.  
In Gulf countries the divide is between the security of public sector employment and relative 
uncertainty associated with private-sector employment (of particular interest for this report). For 
example, in Oman around 12 per cent of the private sector workforce are national citizens 
compared to 53 per cent of the population being national. Public-sector jobs in Gulf countries 
have historically been secure and comfortable as the government used oil money revenues to 
look after their citizens. Now the government needs to tighten spending and so want encourage 
nationals into the private sector where the working environment is more competitive. This is 
generally an unfavourable option for locals who are used to the comfort provided by public sector 
work and the government want to make this transition with minimal social unrest. Private sector 
firms have a good supply of migrant labour who are happy to work in the conditions that are 
present. The private sector are important for diversified economies so governments must also 
maintain good relations and minimise the raising of costs.  
Options for increasing nationalisation of the private sector workforce: 
 Education. Residents need appropriate capacity to work in the private sector. This 
includes soft skills, vocational qualifications and high-level English language ability. 
Education reform should be undertaken as a long-term solution to the problem. Training 
schemes could be considered outside of regular education systems. 
 Subsidising private sector to employ nationals. Anti-corruption measures are 
required for this to be effective. 
 Nationalisation quotas. Mandating companies to employ nationals. Again, anti-
corruption measures are required here and economic inefficiencies may be introduced.  
 Minimum wage for nationals. The costs here may fall on the company or the wage may 
be subsidised by the government. Corruption is less likely for this policy.  
 Reduce expat work permits. Allowing more job opportunities for the local population.  
 Employment agencies to assist with job matching.  
 Hiring caps or admission exams in the public sector to reduce nationals entering. 
 Reducing pay rises in the public sector to reduce the attractiveness of public sector 
employment and improve efficiency.  
There was little evidence on the merits of these measures identified within the scope of this 
review. One study suggests successful nationalisation in the banking sector in Saudi Arabia was 
due to employers’ provision of specific training for locals and relaxation of working hours to make 
employment more attractive. Research which sought the opinion of human resource managers in 
private companies suggest education and English speaking skills are important. Increasing 
motivation of nationals was also highlighted as a problem by employers. Locals expect higher 
wages and these norms are going to take time to adjust.  
Reforms in Europe have included relaxation of dismissal procedures which may be a useful 
consideration for public sector employment in Gulf countries. Countries such as Italy and Spain 
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expanded the grounds for redundancy and mandated reinstatement for unfair dismissals was 
dropped. Some improvements in labour market segmentation have been shown from these 
measures in conjunction with other policies. In Germany, reducing unemployment benefits has 
reduced the reservation wage1.  
A situation analysis should be carried out in-country to assess labour supply and demand trends 
when considering labour market reform policies.  
The problem of dualism was noted as particularly difficult for young people in Europe but not 
different according to gender. Gender differences were not discussed in the literature on the 
Middle East. In Asia, a move against discrimination in hiring would ensure citizens of each 
gender have an equal chance.  
 
2. Background 
A dual labour market is characterised by segregation between job bands.2 The upper tier are 
described as having higher salaries, benefits, security, and better working conditions compared 
to the lower tier.3 The upper tier are often well unionised. The lower tier tend to consist of greater 
proportions of youth and women.4 Reforms to address this predominantly reduce employment 
protection in the upper tier, and improve regulation of temporary work which tends to dominate 
the lower tier. Policies to make dismissal easier helps reduce segregation. The literature talks 
about moving to an ideal known as ‘flexicurity’ where jobs are more uniformly both flexible and 
secure (eg. Ehmer & Schwegmann, 2017; Eichorst et al., 2017)). No country is identified as 
having successfully moved away from this kind of segregation but some experience is reported 
and some level of success achieved.  
This report touches on different types of reform with a leaning towards relevance for increasing 
nationalisation of private sector work forces.  
 
3. Encouraging public sector workers into the private 
sector in Gulf countries 
A predominant labour market segregation issue in the Gulf is an excess of local people in well 
paid public sector jobs and migrant workers employed in the private sector. In Oman, only 
around 12 per cent of the workforce in the private sector are nationals (compared to 53 per cent 
nationals in the population), see table 1 (Carvalho, Youseff, & Dunais, 2018). Governments have 
over-staffed using oil revenue and public sector jobs are preferred for their favourable working 
                                                   
1 The least amount a worker is prepared to work for. https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-
glossary/reservation-wage-definition-meaning/ [Accessed 19/7/19] 
2 https://www.hrzone.com/hr-glossary/what-are-dual-labour-markets [Accessed 15/7/19] 
3 https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/dual-labor-markets [Accessed 15/7/19] 
4 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/12/lessons-from-polands-dual-labour-market/ [Accessed 15/7/19] 
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hours, wages and security. Expatriates are available for lower wages and are more likely to have 
the desirable skills.  
Table 1: Share of nationals in private sector workforce and their share in the population (adapted 
from (Carvalho, Youseff, & Dunais, 2018).   
 
Country Proportion of nationals in 
private workforce 
Proportion of nationals in 
population 
Qatar 2 percent 12 percent 
UAE 2 percent 16 percent 
Kuwait 5 percent 31 percent 
Bahrain 15 percent 46 percent 
Oman 12 percent 53 percent 
Saudi Arabia 22 percent 63 percent 
 
There is a general drive to improve representation of local workers in the private sector in these 
countries. Governments are looking to reduce wage bills but maintain the social contract.  
Saudi Arabia are undertaking education reforms so that young people may acquire the skills 
required to work in the private sector (Oxford Business Group, 2016). These include soft skills 
and vocational qualifications. They aim to increase enrolment almost 9-fold between 2016 and 
2020.5  
A consultancy report for the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) (Carvalho, Youseff, & Dunais, 
2018) discusses seven policy tools for improving the representation of nationals in the private 
sector labour market: 
1) Subsidies for the private sector for employing nationals. Anti-corruption measures 
are required to make sure that companies are not claiming for ‘ghost employees’.6 In 
practice employers and employees have found loopholes which require a high-level of 
monitoring and inspection. Kuwait used this policy, which led to more nationals applying 
for private-sector jobs but resulted in an estimated 15 per cent of the national workforce 
in ‘ghost employment’. To improve this, employers must now include training for 
graduates to be eligible for the subsidy. 
2) Nationalisation quotas. Mandating companies to employ a certain number of nationals. 
The instrument must balance fines for non-compliance with benefits for those exceeding 
targets. The same problems are inherent as above, employees seeking money to be 
registered as employed although not working. There must be an adequate supply of 
nationals with the right skills for this policy to work. This policy has had some success in 
Saudi Arabia but also led to some business closures for those who could not absorb the 
higher cost of labour.  
3) Minimum wage for nationals. Some countries within the GCC have different minimum 
wage for nationals than for expats. This tool tends to mitigate ghost employment, 
increases incentive for nationals to work in the private sector, and forces companies to 
improve productivity to overcome higher costs where quotas are in place; for example to 
replace lower-skilled workers with technology. Subsidising employees is recommended 
(rather than enforcing quotas) to neutralise the negative impact of having to pay a non-
competitive wage.  
                                                   
5 https://vision2030.gov.sa/en/programs/HCDP  [Accessed 15/7/19] 
6 https://www.gpayroll.com/blog/payroll/what-is-a-ghost-employee.html  [Accessed 15/7/19] 
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4) Expat Work permits. Preventing expats from entering the country to work. This could 
be limiting the number of visas issued or levies on a company seeking a work permit for 
an employee. Work permit fees can be raised and set at different levels depending on 
industry, job title or skill level as the government may choose; balancing other policies in 
place. Care must be taken in raising costs for the private sector as they are very 
important for keeping a diversified economy.  
5) Job-matching and training services. Governments sponsoring employment agencies 
to assist in matching employees and employers. This could be in-person or online. This 
can also include counselling and training. In the absence of education for private-sector 
skills on-the-job training is recommended. Some governments organise country-wide 
training schemes with large private employers. In Switzerland, 70 per cent of teenagers 
are enrolled in apprenticeship programmes running alongside school.7   
6) Hiring caps or admission exams in the public sector. Preventing or reducing 
nationals from entering the private sector.  
7) Performance-based compensation in public service. Making evaluation processes 
for pay rises more stringent. Including measures which are not subjective by the 
reviewer reduces cultural habit of rating employees as outstanding. These might include 
attendance, and meeting pre-defined targets. In Kuwait the vast majority were achieving 
the highest score in their annual evaluation. They have updated the evaluation to include 
attendance and hard indicators.  
The last two measures, public sector initiatives, may be unpopular but begin to send messages 
about the changing social contract.  
The GCC consultancy report advises an in-depth situation analysis to understand where labour 
supply and demand is headed before setting policies. This includes assessing labour force 
capabilities and workforce needs. And accounting for macro-economic political, regional, and 
technological trends. Once in place, monitoring and feedback loops are required. A mixture of 
policy tools are recommended for greatest impact and each market will have different needs. 
Policies to improve the business environment and the education sector must be considered 
alongside. Independent authorities should be established and to ensure policy implementation 
and transparency.  
A survey of executives and human resource managers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) looked 
for perspectives on nationalising private sector workforce (Al-Ali, 2008). Barriers to employing 
locals highlighted were low standards of education and inadequate skills, insufficient English 
speaking ability, and low levels of trust in the effort of nationals. Another survey of human 
resource personnel in UAE identified lack of motivation of locals as a key barrier and also 
concern over what rights would be expected by national employees (Forstenlechner et al., 2012). 
These were identified as more of an issue than lack of educational qualifications and high 
reservation wages. A paper analysing business-focussed newspapers finds skill standards to be 
the biggest challenge for recruitment of Emirati nationals, followed by salary and benefits, and 
thirdly, business hours (Aljanahi, 2017).  
A conference paper analysed determinants of success in nationalising private-sector workforces 
in Saudi Arabia (Alanezi, 2012). Institutional determinants came out as most important for 
success. This includes organisation rules; regulation constraints; penalties for violations; social 
and behavioural values of the organisation; and social-cognitive perspectives of employers. 
                                                   
7 https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicholaswyman/2017/10/20/jobs-now-learning-from-the-swiss-apprenticeship-
model/  [Accessed 15/7/19] 
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Effective increase of national employees in the banking sector in Saudi Arabia has been due to 
bank provision of specific training for local recruits and revised working hours to promote the 
attractiveness of the post (Edgar et al, 2016).   
4. Dual labour markets in Europe 
Labour markets in Europe are said to be characterised by ‘extensive dismissal protection, little 
flexibility at employer level, and dual structures’ (Ehmer & Schwegmann, 2017, p1). The divide 
between secure and insecure jobs is related to macroeconomic efficiency, the wellbeing of 
workers and social cohesion (Eichhorst et al., 2017). After the 2008/9 financial crisis, European 
countries aimed to improve flexibility by decentralising wage bargaining and reducing protection 
of dismissal. Working hour regulations were also relaxed. World Economic Forum surveys 
suggest this has made the labour markets more efficient, particularly from 2014 in Spain and Italy 
(Ehmer & Schwegmann, 2017, p1).  
Italy’s labour market was highly segmented. Reforms aimed to reduce protection of dismissal but 
also improve employee rights. Reforms in 2012 expanded the economic grounds for redundancy. 
Unemployment support was introduced across the board including longer periods of income 
support. More stringent legal conditions were imposed on certain temporary contracts. 
Employers were taxed more on temporary employees, and they would be refunded if employees 
were made permanent. In 2014, a ‘Jobs Act’ was introduced. This banned court-ordered 
reinstatement of workers who had been dismissed for economic reasons (Eichhorst et al., 2017). 
These provisions only apply to the private sector and not to public administration (Pinelli et al., 
2017). Contracts restrict job-sharing and joint ventures with contribution of labour. New contracts 
reduced severance payments and unemployment benefits were again expanded. The uncertainty 
that made dismissals costly has been reduced and data suggests the new rules on dismissals 
has reduced segmentation. Employers were incentivised for hiring new employees and open-
ended contracts. Hiring incentives have improved reallocation. Certain temporary contracts were 
simplified to improve access to the labour market, particularly for young people. The Act has 
reduced unemployment rates to some extent (Eichhorst et al., 2017). The relaxed dismissal 
protection is only in place for new employees so will take time to yield results. Employers were 
given financial incentives to put the new contract into use.  
In Spain, the proportion of employees on temporary contracts is particularly high. Reforms in 
2010 and 2012 strengthened decentralised wage determination. Employers could make 
individual agreements with employees rather than having to use industry or regional levels. This 
is thought to have improved the balance between wages and productivity (OCED, 2014). 
Businesses were also allowed to modify wages and hours according to economic needs. 
Employees can then have more choice in responding to shocks other than dismissal. Protection 
against dismissal was loosened allowing wider technical, organisational and economic reasons 
(Eichhorst, 2018). Employers previously had to prove that the employee being dismissed would 
adversely affect future profitability, and severance payments for wrongful dismissals were halved. 
However, enforcement must be adequate and judicial procedures reasonably paced to ensure 
liberalisation in this area (Wölfl & Mora-Sanguinettii, 2011). Small firms were subsidised for hiring 
younger and older workers. One-year probation periods are allowed in new contracts in small- 
and medium-sized enterprises. Labour market segmentation has not yet shown improvement 
since the reforms (Ehmer & Schwegmann, 2017).  
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Dismissal protection of permanent contracts has also been reduced in Slovenia. Permanent 
contracts were implemented with a shorter notice period and lower severance pay. Dismissal 
procedures were simplified in 2013. Monetary compensation was allowed instead of 
reinstatement for unfair dismissal cases, and firms no longer need to prove that redeployment 
was attempted before dismissal was issued. The long-term effects of the reform cannot yet be 
assessed. A preliminary evaluation was positive (Vodopivec et al., 2016). 
Portugal carried out reforms 2012 (Eichhorst et al., 2018). Severance payments were lowered 
and aligned between fixed and permanent contracts. This covered new contracts only. Reasons 
for dismissals were also widened. Dismissals were further encouraged by making employers pay 
into a monthly dismissal fund to cover severance payments and support employees in the case 
of company bankruptcy. On-the job search and hiring have improved though regulatory gaps still 
persist, fixed-term contracts were liberalised at the same time. Economic uncertainty makes 
employers reluctant to hire permanent staff.  
Greece and Slovenia also reduced notice periods and severance pay for newly hired permanent 
workers (Eichhorst et al., 2017). Reforms in France are relatively recent. Dismissal protection 
has been introduced but is taking some time to change employers’ behaviours (Eichhorst et al., 
2018). Overall, labour reforms in Europe in the 2010s have not shown clear impact. In Germany 
in 2005, unemployment benefits were reduced which lowered reservation wages and 
encouraged the unemployed into work and unemployment has been reduced since 2005 
(Kirkegaard, 2014).   
The European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs produced a paper 
looking at addressing the dualism characterised by the divide between temporary and permanent 
employment (Eichhorst et al., 2018). Single-open ended contracts are proposed to bridge the 
divide between fixed-term and temporary contracts. Dismissals can then be spread more evenly 
over employees with differing degrees of seniority. These have not yet been rolled out by any 
country. Case studies in the paper show that re-regulation of temporary work has been the main 
instrument used to address dualism.  
5. Dual labour markets in Asia 
A rapid assessment of the literature on dualism in Asia seemed of low relevance to the situation 
in the Middle-East so is only touched on briefly here.  
Korea have experienced similar problems to Europe of duality between permanent and 
temporary employment (Grubb et al., 2007). Japan are developing a system of “Equal pay for 
Equal work” with a legal framework for fair and equitable treatment of workers regardless of 
status, fixed or part-time, working conditions and pay (Thévenot, 2017). An IMF paper proposes 
policy-options to reduce duality in Japan (Aoyagi & Ganelli, 2013). These include replacing fixed- 
and short-term contracts with single open-ended contracts; limiting regular contracts by job 
content, working hours, or relocations; and a “moral suasion” strategy encouraging employers to 
increase wages but with government not being part of the negotiations. The paper suggests that 
reforms for converting non-regular employment to regular are unlikely to work.  
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